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Madoff

Last week Bernard Madoff decided to throw in the towel on his own Ponzi scheme and confess to one of the largest cases of alleged fraud in the hedge fund industry, known to date. The list of direct investors includes astute and reputable investors. The details of the scheme are as yet unknown but the opportunity for fraud and the vulnerability of the structure of the fund is immediately apparent and indeed has been apparent to investors since inception. In fact, the fund documents are transparent as to all the structural weaknesses of the fund.

How does one invest in a fund managed by Madoff? Unless one has a sufficiently large checkbook, the only way to invest is through a feeder fund. Madoff’s business model is based on scale and to this end, rather than have in house distribution and marketing, Madoff uses intermediaries to raise capital in what is sometimes known as white labeled or private labeled products. An intermediary sets up a fund and raises capital for that fund. This fund then invests substantially all of its assets in a ‘fund’ or more accurately in the case of Madoff, a managed account managed by Madoff. Typically in a white labeled agreement, a feeder fund invests in a master fund. That is, an investor puts money in the feeder fund. The feeder fund then invests that money in the master fund. Corporate governance requires that each fund will have its own investment advisor, independent administrator, prime brokers, custodian banks, auditors. In the case of Madoff, the feeder funds did have their own investment advisor, independent administrator, prime brokers, custodian banks, auditors. The master accounts with Madoff Securities, unfortunately, did not.

In the typical structure of a Madoff run fund, the white labeled fund into which the end investor puts their money would have a reputable independent administrator, custodian, auditor (usually one of the big 4). The investment advisor would be the sponsor (and marketer) of the fund. The fund, however, would establish an account at Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities Inc, a registered broker dealer it should be noted, who would trade the account. The prime broker and custodian of the fund would also be Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities Inc. And here the independence is lost. Without independent oversight, the opportunity for fraud became abundant. One should note that the structure itself was not the fraud, it was the weakness in control that the structure introduced that provided the opportunity for fraud.

The marketing materials of many of these white labeled funds would often refer to the transparency that they were getting from Madoff Securities, and there is no reason to doubt this claim, however, one should question the value of receiving said transparency from a custodian which was a connected party to the fund manager.

In a sense, the white label sponsors were conspirators after the fact since it would have been very difficult to perpetrate a fraud without their involvement. An investor investing directly with Madoff, had there been such a fund offering would have seen the weakness of not having an independent custodian, let alone prime broker, let alone administrator. The auditors would have had to face individual investors for each and every round of due diligence. Too often, an end investor gaining access through the white labeled fund would have seen only the service providers of the white labeled fund and been satisfied with the quality of these service providers without delving further and asking the same questions of the managed account at Madoff.

At the heart of the problem is NOT a failure of due diligence, since the weaknesses of the structure were fully disclosed in fund due diligence materials and offering memoranda. There was no effort to misrepresent the structure or to cover it up. Investors therefore invested with full information or at least access to sufficient information to make an informed judgment. Why would reputable sponsors attach their reputations and fortunes to a deficient structure, and why did end investors knowing invest?




Some investment strategies for 2009

Closed end funds:
Fund structure mitigates investor risk
Suitable for arbitrage strategies
Suitable for relative value strategies
Suitable for distressed and private equity strategies
Lends itself to efficient and risk controlled deployment of leverage
Technically complex strategies which rely on multiple trade legs

Distressed investing:
Current cycle is attractive for distressed investing
Distressed assets and distressed pricing in developed markets
Distressed pricing and performing assets in emerging markets

Recovery strategies:
Distressed strategies are a subset
Deep value equity
Deep value credit

Direct lending:
Dearth of credit, easy or otherwise
Banks are retrenching from the market
Spreads and margins are priced for distress despite strong and performing obligors
Bespoke deal structures to mitigate specific risks
Trade finance

Stale strategies:
Short or market neutral credit
Short or market neutral equity
Long volatility – vega
Systematic global macro

Fresh strategies:
Long equity
Long credit (including CBs and private CBs)
Capital structure arbitrage
Distressed investing: control over asset
Factoring, receivables finance, trade finance
Fixed income arbitrage
Risk arbitrage – cross border strategic




Convertible Bonds

An opportunity exists today for a long only buy and hold strategy. The strategy is vulnerable to further mark to market losses but a strategy of investing in CBs from a credit point of view, as opposed to an equity arbitrage point of view yields interesting opportunities. Things could get cheaper next year, and indeed the way economic fundamentals are deteriorating this seems likely, but current pricing is already very attractive for the investor who can buy and hold.

Note that the classic convertible arbitrage construction doesn’t really work and one has to take on both the open equity and credit risk. Neither can one lever the portfolio, not that one needs to. Stock borrow, restrictions on shorting, terms of borrow make delta hedging a potentially futile exercise. Some converts are trading distressed to the extent that while a non zero delta has re emerged, convexity is no longer positive. Credit hedging the CB runs into all sorts of prime broker counterparty risk, and the correlation between CBs and straight bonds let alone CDS is broken at the moment. This makes life simpler, actually, since if one has the resources in credit analysis, there is no need to hire a hedge fund manager.




A Currency Call

Commodity prices are overly depressed. See post 27 Nov 2008, A Quick Macro Overview.

Buy AUD, sell USD. 



Central Planning

Why is it a bad thing for a central planner to allocate resources in an economy? The Soviet experience is one example. Underlying it is the lack of alignment of interest between principal and agent. If one does not reap the benefits of one’s investment decisions, those decisions are bound to be less than optimal. A central planner will never offer a better solution than rational independent agents making private decisions.

In my previous posts, I have argued that the setting of interest rates by central banks is already a dangerous compromise to the principle of a free market. So, given that we have made that compromise, and the moral hazard that resulted has taken us in no small part to where we are today, a financial crisis feeding and fed by economic recession, lets ask a couple of silly questions.
Why is it a bad thing for a central planner to lend directly to private consumers and private enterprise? From our initial premise, it is equivalent to allocation of resources, in this case financial capital. It presupposes that the central planner has sufficient information and motivation to act in the best interest of the collective (always a dangerous concept), and isn’t too clumsy as to make too many mistakes.
Today, however, credit spreads have widened to acutely high levels, despite central banks liquefying the banking system. Banks which previously lent in greed, now withhold credit in fear. We know that a central planner is sub optimal compared with rational agents and their private decisions, but what about timees when agents are irrational? (again calls for a very tenuous definition of rational and irrational.)
When government chose to bail out the financial system in the Fall of 2008, it had already abandoned the idea of free market solutions. It must have concluded that a climate of irrationality, or, where individual rationality conflicted with collective rationality, existed. Its efforts included a massive liquefication of the banking industry, an effort that has so far proved futile as banks have saved the liquidity and placed the capital back with the central banks. The intention to get the banking industry to lend once again has been foiled.
If the premise remains that a climate of irrationality, or ,where individual rationality conflicted with collective rationality, exists, central planners should be happy to extend their abandonment of market solutions.
Lend directly to private individuals and enterprise.
That is the conceptual argument. The devil is in the details. More on this later.