Some Issues In Mutual Fund Investing.

 

1. One of the problems in mutual fund investing is how they are sold to investors.

 

a. High front end commissions. Mutual funds typically charge a commission to invest in them. This commission is paid to the distributor of the mutual fund, such as a bank or an independent financial adviser. Just like any other product marketing has a cost. Mutual funds can charge up to 5%, sometimes more, in commissions. Distributors receive these fees ostensibly for providing advice. Perhaps, but if so, why are the fees charged by the funds and rebated to the distributors and not paid directly by clients to their bank. By accepting payment from the fund manager instead of the investor, distributors work for the fund manager, not the investor. How about sophisticated investors who do not require advice but are faced with subscription commissions wherever they turn? In a low yield environment even a 1% commission can eat up 3 months’ worth of gross returns.

 

b. High management fees. Mutual funds charge different clients different fees. Institutional clients pay half of what retail clients pay, sometimes even less. The primary reason for the difference is that retail funds’ fees have to be shared with distributors such as banks and IFAs in what are called trailer fees. A fund charging 1.5% per annum will pay its distributor 0.75% per annum on the assets raised. Fortunately there are some banks who eschew this practice and either invest their clients’ money in institutional share classes, which incur much lower fees, or rebate any trailer fees they get on to their clients. In certain markets like the UK, it has become illegal to pay trailer fees to distributors. In Asia trailer fees are the norm.

 

c. Opaque fee structures and conflicts of interest of distributors. The payment of trailer fees to distributors creates a conflict of interest. Distributors have a strong incentive to sell funds with high trailer fees or commissions. Whereas fund distributors claim to represent the interests of their investors they are in fact being paid by the fund managers. Low volatility funds often also have low expected returns and fund managers scale their management fees accordingly. Since trailer fees are usually a cut of management fees distributors prefer to sell investors high risk, high returning funds which charge high fees to low volatility funds. Investors are allowed to believe that their banks are working for them when in fact they are working for the fund managers as their distributors.

 

2. Underperformance of benchmarks is addressed below under “When ETFs are more effective.”

 

3. Mutual funds are aggregation vehicles when it comes to market systemic risk. As more capital comes to be controlled by fewer independent decision makers, systemic risks are raised. CLOs and CDOs dominated the demand for loans and bonds in the years prior to the 2008 crisis.

 

a. The size of a fund should be seen in the context of its market. A fund which represents too large a proportion of total trading or total holdings in a particular market is risky from a liquidity aspect.

 

b. The aggregate size of mutual funds as a percentage of total market size is another risk factor since mutual fund managers and their investors are likely to behave similarly.

 

 

There are a number of reasons for investors to invest in investment funds.

 

1. They are a practical and convenient tool and component to deploy a diversified global portfolio. Regional, country, sector and asset class funds allow the investor to construct a portfolio to their own requirements.

2. Investment funds offer a diversified portfolio within a defined investment objective. Funds diversify the idiosyncratic risk while retaining the thematic risk so a single security or issuer cannot derail a sound thematic investment strategy.

3. Outsource investment strategy to experts in their particular fields. Funds allow investors to delegate investment strategy to professionals of a particular focus and specialization.

4. Related to point 2 abov
e is divisibility. Some securities can only be traded in large values. If an investor’s portfolio is too small it may be impossible to invest in such securities or to invest in such securities with sufficient diversification.

5. Access. Certain instruments and markets are not easily accessed by retail investors. Catastrophe bonds, asset backed securities, structured credit, freight futures, commodity derivatives, etc are examples of instruments which are traded by institutional investors and not retail investors but which can be accessed through funds.

 

 

When Exchange Traded Funds Are More Effective.

 

1. One of the criticisms of mutual funds is costs. Mutual fund managers charge annual management fees, and some even charge performance fees. In order for a manager to return the same as their benchmark on a net basis, they must outperform their benchmarks by the quantum of their fees on a gross basis. Empirical evidence suggests that on average, mutual fund managers are unable to compensate for the fee drag. An exchange traded fund or ETF may be the solution to the fee problem. Due to scale and the mechanical nature of the portfolio construction ETFs charge very low fees. In some cases, the index replication strategies are sufficiently clever that they even recoup the little transaction, administration and custody expenses incurred by the fund.

 

2. Highly efficient markets are difficult to outperform. The US equity market is a good example where very few active managers outperform the index. In such markets, an ETF is more efficient.

 

3. Highly liquid and efficient markets are easier to replicate in an ETF. In illiquid markets.

 

4. ETFs can be traded at any time during the trading day. Mutual funds are typically traded at the NAV at the close of the day. Some mutual funds have poorer redemption liquidity which may be weekly or monthly.

 

5. The cost in trading ETFs is normal trading commissions which have seen significant compression over the years. Mutual funds can and often do involve paying a hefty up front commission to the distributor of the funds. Commissions can be as high as 5% or higher in certain markets.

 

 

When Mutual Funds Are More Effective.

 

1. There are some markets which are simply not tracked by indices or ETFs. An example is the non-agency MBS market. While there are a number of large and well known MBS (mortgage backed security) ETFs these invest entirely in agency mortgages. The non-agency MBS market is simply not represented by any ETF.

 

2. There are some funds which have a theme or strategy that is not represented by any index or ETF. Hedge Fund Research, an index compilation company has compiled investable indices called HFRX so that even hedge fund strategies are replicable and can be accessed through an ETF but there remain some areas which ETFs have not reached. ETF providers are, however, trying to complete their shelf and are constantly evolving new strategies.

 

3. On average, by definition, mutual funds make a gross return equal to their benchmarks, which after fees and expenses, is below the benchmark. There are, however, mutual funds whose managers consistently outperform their benchmarks. The incidence of these managers is in part determined by the efficiency of the market. More efficient markets like US equities, are more difficult to outperform. Less liquid and less efficient markets enable active management and outperformance. They also enable underperformance.

 

 

Bottom Line:

 

1. As with all things investors should know the product at least as well, if not better than, their advisors.

 

2. Regulators should address the conflicts of interest in how mutual funds are offered to end investors. Regulation in the UK for example has been enacted to address the trailer fee issue.

 

3. Investors should be aware not just of the fees, costs and expenses in fund investing but of who are the beneficiaries of these fees, costs and expenses so that a judgment can be made as to the quality of advice they obtain from the various parties.

 

4. There are circumstances under which actively managed mutual funds can be used and circumstances under which ETFs should be used. One is not always and everywhere superior to the other.

 

 

 

 

 

India is an interesting market. Modi’s election success boosted equity markets but lately delays in reform have stalled the market which is some 10% of its 2015 highs.

 

Growth:

• Near term the economy is slowing but long term potential remains strong.

• India has strong demographics with the working age population rising as a percentage of total and is expected to peak only some 20 years from now.

• The urban population in India is rising at an accelerating rate and per capital income is rising.

• Current GDP growth is 7.5% YOY. Inflation is 5%. With a 2 trillion USD nominal GDP economy, India has plenty of room to grow.

• India has for a long time had strong growth potential but was held back by excessive bureaucracy, corruption and inefficiency. A reformist government may unlock this potential.

Government:

• The Modi government has a strong mandate with 282 out of 543 seats in parliament making it the first simple majority government since the Congress government in 1984.

• Modi’s mandate is growth and development. He has been a good Chief Minister of Gujarat with 4 consecutive terms and has shown talent as a strong CEO.

• The government is addressing a number of areas for reform:

  • Ease of doing business, moving to on line licensing and rationalizing other administrative functions.

  • Improving the investment climate, for example increasing FDI limits in selected industries like insurance, defense and railways, circumventing potential for corruption through more transparent processes, and more government co-investment in infrastructure.

  • Fiscal policy, to continue fiscal consolidation and removal of price distorting subsidies, for example in energy and transport, and to make government expenditure more efficient.

  • Taxation, simplifying the tax code, consolidating state and federal taxes into a single GST, expected to be circa 20% – 22%, also lowering corporate taxes from 30% to 25% over the next 4 years.

  • Banking and financial services, take for example the roll out of formal banking services to the general population (target circa 110 million new accounts), and the further augmenting of the bankruptcy law (last week creditors were granted rights to wrest control of management of defaulting companies.)

Corporate sector and Markets:

• RBI has made 3 rate cuts this year, most recently 2 weeks ago to take the repo rate from 7.50% to 7.25%.

• The Indian market is dominated by private sector business with SOE’s conspicuously absent. Companies are entrepreneurial and therefore capital and asset efficient.

• Long run ROEs are 17% compared with 11% for the rest of the world and 12% in emerging markets.

• Current ROEs are circa 15% and EBIT margins are around 10% which are cyclical lows.

• Market PE is 16.3X which is at the long term average. The market is relatively cheap considering that corporate profitability is at cyclical lows.

Risks:

• Things always take longer than planned or expected in India. This is one of the consequences of India’s democracy and bureaucracy. For example, the GST bill is facing opposition in Parliament and will only be reintroduced in July. It is expected to be passed during the monsoon season.

• While bureaucracy is being rolled back and even civil servants are optimistic about the progress legacy issues remain. Take for example the retroactive nature of the Minimum Alternate Tax which has caused much confusion and is still in resolution.

• Inflation may yet rise. The monsoon can affect near term inflation through food prices. India is energy dependent and affected by the oil price. We expect the oil price to remain capped and that long term the oil price will not appreciate significantly.

• Infrastructure remains poor despite the stated aims to increase infrastructure investment.

• INR exposure is difficult or costly to hedge. Interest rate differentials imply FX hedging costs between USD and INR to be circa 7%.

Since the last FOMC meeting in April, economic data have improved. Most recently US payrolls and average hourly earnings have picked up and retail sales have rebounded. Only inflationary pressures have been conspicuously missing. Yet inflation is but one consideration for the Fed. As rescuer of last resort to the economy and the financial system the Fed is now about 7 years into a recovery with all its emergency bail out policies fully deployed. It needs to reset some of these tools in case of another financial or economic crisis. Granted, it also has to do this without precipitating a financial or economic crisis.

The bottom line is that the Fed wants to raise rates. It may not be able to. It has already signalled that it wants to raise rates and it that the path of rate hikes will be gradual. We can see why, the incremental interest expense to each 25 basis point hike (assuming it flows through the rest of the term structure uniformly) will be of the order of tens of billions of USD per annum, not large but not insignificant either.

The Fed has prepared the market for a rate hike for some time and the focus and attention on the next rate hike suggests that the market is prepared for it. What the market may not be prepared for is further delays which could signal a weaker economy than previously thought.

 

If the Greek’s were hoping for a bailout, their approach to obtaining one is novel. One would have expected a more conciliatory approach. Their current approach suggests that they are unwilling or unable, probably the latter, to comply with the creditors plan. It seems therefore that the choice before the Greeks is austerity in Euros or austerity in Drachmas.

The choice for the creditors is receiving fewer Euros or more Drachmas.

You can’t lend a debtor into solvency. Greece needs to find a long term solution and to do that it needs to decide what it wants to be, not simply what it wants to do. I think that it may be in Greece’s interest to exit the Euro and face the austerity that it will face in any case, in Drachmas, where it will at least have freedom over its monetary policy, although it will be constrained in the international capital markets. As it is, it has no control over monetary policy and it is constrained in the debt markets.

Varoufakis’ game theory experience must advise him that Greece needs to leave the Euro before it is ejected, just as the best strategy for the Eurozone is to eject Greece before it leaves lest other members see exit as painless. The fact is that the pain is not because it is the Eurozone that Greece is leaving but that it is Greece that is leaving the Eurozone. The Eurozone will want to preserve the former myth and the Greeks will probably want to avoid the latter inference. So everyone is served in some way.

The only legitimate complaint the Greeks might have is that the Eurozone suppressed their cost of debt, an analgesic that allowed the country’s deficiencies to persist and accumulate without symptoms for so long. Only the return of country risk in the wake of 2008 awoke the various countries to their conditions as sovereign spreads diverged to reflect individual members’ default risk.

There is some concern that with the internationalization of the RMB and its eventual inclusion in the SDR, that China’s demand for USD and US treasuries will fall. There may be other reasons why China’s demand for USD and US treasuries may fall but the SDR inclusion and RMB internationalization is not a primary concern. China’s decision to hold USD and US treasuries is not determined by the RMBs reserve status. As far as China is concerned, the RMB has reserve status since this is China’s own sovereign currency.

A tighter trade surplus may result in lower demand for treasuries.